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Ch. 1 Introduction 
1.1 Abstract: Flood Risk, Vulnerabilities, and Resilience 
 
Section 1.1 | Figure 1: Homes inundated by flooding from Superstorm Sandy  
Photo Credit: Mario Tama/Getty Images 
Climate change has posed tremendous threats to nations worldwide, and the 
impacts have been widely felt across the United States. In recent years, natural 
disasters have affected some of our country’s most densely populated areas, leaving 
coastal areas vulnerable, many communities and businesses at-risk, and thousands 
struggling even today (Anderson, 2016). In fact, evidence shows that “beyond tearing 
apart physical infrastructure and claiming lives, natural disasters damage social bonds 
and community networks, debilitating communities even after infrastructure is rebuilt” 
(Landau, 2017). With the prevalence and frequency of natural disasters steadily 
increasing, the question of how to best build community resilience in a way that not only 
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mitigates hazards, but also significantly reduces vulnerabilities and social impact is 
more crucial than before.   
Because the topic of disaster resiliency is fairly young and has only recently 
become an organizing principle of disaster policy and practice, the evidence base 
regarding best practices for implementing resilience at the local level is still emerging. 
According to Susan Cutter and Christopher Emrich, “less attention has also been 
attributed to scholarly analyses of policy learning and change” given that recovery is still 
the least understood (and least studied) part of the emergency management cycle 
(Cutter & Emrich, 2015). However, research shows that recovery is most difficult in 
areas where “people do not mobilize the internal and external resources available to 
address the vulnerabilities and issues they face” (Dieye, 2012). Yet, according to 
Disaster Resilience: A National Imperative, building community resilience in the face of 
disaster risk can also have multiple benefits for a community even in the absence of a 
disaster, helping resolve “mundane challenges” as well (NAP, 2012). In such cases, 
community-based organizations can be an important contribution to cultivating resilient 
efforts.  
In the case of Hurricane Sandy, critical lessons demonstrate that underlying 
issues of lack of trust and the absence of sustainable engagement with community-
based organizations create significant disparities in resilient outcomes following 
emergencies and disasters (Plough, 2013). Recognizing this, over the past five years 
since Hurricane Sandy, New York City policymakers, researchers, and planners have 
been exploring ways in which top-down resiliency policy along with innovative 
community-driven projects can be integrated to foster social bonds, community 
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networks, and organization within struggling communities. This study aims to narrate 
how City and local agencies have restructured their priorities to focus on resilience 
since Sandy, and understand the importance of community-based organizations and 
community-centric approaches in facilitating recovery efforts and strengthening local 




















1.2 Organization of Study 
 
Section 1.2 | Figure 2: A man walks along the beach through the debris-stricken and heavily 
damaged Rockaway neighborhood in Queens, where a large section of the iconic boardwalk 
was washed away in November 2, 2012 in New York. With the death toll over 70 and millions of 
homes and businesses without power, this image is representative of the millions who struggled 
to recover from the effects of floods, fires, and power outages brought on by Hurricane Sandy.  
Photo Credit: Spencer Platt/Getty Images 
The United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goal to “Empower Inclusive, 
Productive, and Resilient Cities” proposes that all cities develop “participative, 
accountable, and effective city governance to support rapid and equitable urban 
transformation” (Revi & Solecki, 2013). Although this may be effective, if people do not 
mobilize the internal and external resources available to address the issues they face, 
then whether or not these top-down policies or initiatives take place, offers no baseline 
value (Dieye, 2012). It is not only important that community-based insight and 
contribution is incorporated into plans, and resilience policies are implemented in the 
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City, but also that investment in the community encourages social engagement and 
cohesion, in a way that stands the test of time.  
Mark Pelling’s definition of resiliency as adaptive transformation is what we will 
be referring to in this paper – “the ability of a City or a community to open adaptive 
possibilities for organizations or individuals, either forced by systems failure or chosen 
in anticipation of collapse and movement to a novel socio-ecological state” (Pelling, 
2011). This interpretation ascribes transformation to “adaptive actions that have the 
ability to shift existing systems onto alternative development pathways,” even before 
resistance and challenges to current adaptive pathways are met (Pelling, 2011). Ben 
Wisner argues, this adjusted view of transformation forces decision-makers to look “past 
the concerns of proximate risk, into more structural or root causes, formed by social, 
cultural, and economic relationships” (Wisner et al 2004) that ultimately “help justify 
choices made between incremental and transformative agendas of change” (Pelling, 
2011). In an effort to learn more about the nuances in identifying transformative modes 
of change, this thesis strives to contribute to resilience literature with the following main 
research inquiries: 
 
Over the past five years since Hurricane Sandy, how have local and governmental 
agencies in New York City realigned resilience strategies and priorities, and what 
lessons have we learned? How effective are community-based organizations in filling in 
the gaps in marginalized areas where top-down resilience policies and strategies prove 
insufficient? 
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Structured in four parts, this thesis will begin with literature review focused on 
how resilience theory was formulated, and how lessons from Hurricane Katrina have 
influenced the ways policymakers responded after the Superstorm Sandy. Second, 
through qualitative interviews with government-affiliates, policymakers, developers, 
planners, and technical consultants, this study will narrate how the City and local 
agencies have realigned their resilience work since the storm, through lessons learned 
over the past five years. Third, using these lessons learned, we will observe four distinct 
resilience strategies in Sandy-affected coastal communities that demonstrate the value 
of community engagement and organization or lack thereof. Lastly, conclusions will then 





Ch. 2 Understanding Superstorm Sandy: Response and Recovery 
2.1 Learning from the Past: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina 
 
Section 2.1 | Figure 3: Entire neighborhoods were entirely destroyed after Hurricane Katrina hit. 
Photo Credit: Rick Wilking/Reuters 
 Reflecting back, Hurricane Katrina was a huge turning point in disaster 
management and recovery, and a great amount of literature exists underlining major 
flaws in red tape, response and recovery phases, leaving vulnerable communities in 
precarious conditions without resources or aid. However, disasters like Superstorm 
Sandy, Hurricane Katrina, and many other ones that have preceded them have 
highlighted a pattern during recovery; which is, during the gap period immediately after 
such a shock, it is community response that strongly determines the tenacity and 
duration of recovery and resilience – reminiscent of Eric Klinenberg’s findings based on 
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the 1995 Heatwave in Chicago. In addition to state and city policies focused on 
improving physical infrastructure, it is important to note that, “social connections, 
cohesion, and networks visible after disasters can also make ordinary lives richer and 
more resilient” (Remes, 2015). In addition to improving recovery policies, government 
should – as a matter of integrating resilience within communities – build communities 
that foster and encourage connection and solidarity (Remes, 2015).  
Hurricane Katrina marked a period in time where disaster management and 
recovery in the United States was put to the test; and on August 29, 2005, the entire 
Mississippi coastline was affected with severe storm surges and floods from one of the 
deadliest hurricanes to land in the South; according to reports, “1,833 people across five 
states were killed, $108 billion attributed to property damage,” and millions of people 
were left homeless and displaced along the Gulf Coast in New Orleans (Zimmermann, 
2015). Though the hurricane was foreseen as far more dangerous than its wind speeds 
and intensity suggested, the United Stated federal government, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), and the Army Corps of Engineers were thoroughly 
unprepared for what was to come. 
The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina portrayed major flaws in disaster 
preparedness, recovery and relief from the federal, state and local levels. On one hand, 
there was widespread confusion among federal officials about designated roles and 
responsibilities, and on the other hand, knowledge failure in terms of expertise and 
coordination that led to barriers forming between layers of government, that ultimately 
paralyzed command and control units from acting efficiently. The Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), which focused on community assistance, had 
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emergency supply failures and was completely incompetent in delivering aid to 
struggling communities. Overall, indecisions in part by government officials, arbitrary 
organization, fraud and abuse in allocation of tax money for immediate aid, culminated 
in a disastrous delay in the recovery process, leaving many vulnerable communities to 
fend for themselves (FEMA). 
Perhaps the biggest challenge during Post-Katrina recovery was the uncertainty 
of who was in charge, and this led to a cascading set of consequences onto 
marginalized communities. The federal government’s emergency response system was 
too complex, with multiple agencies overlapping roles and responsibilities, and 
confusing coordination on the ground. Top-down decision-making was far too 
centralized and lacked the “efficiency, learning, innovation, and quality performance,” 
that is generally required to facilitate recovery (HUD, 2012). At the time, FEMA lacked 
the local expertise and knowledge needed to critically evaluate the situation, and lost 
opportunities to mobilize community-based organizations, utilize existing resources, and 
tap into local businesses to form effective partnerships, that would have provided 
quicker and more efficient aid to the locals.  
On the contrary, government agencies like the Coast Guard helped decentralize 
operations and facilitate decision-making, to act rapidly and deploy rescue operations 
on the ground. According to the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD), “existence of cross-state agreements for sharing personnel and assets helped 
provide relief from medical care to law enforcement, and was considered invaluable by 
both Louisiana and Mississippi officials” (HUD, 2012). While “non-profit organizations 
like The Red Cross, Charity Hospital, and The Salvation Army housed thousands of 
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evacuees in shelters and served meals to hurricane survivors, for-profit businesses 
such as Walmart, and Home Depot delivered meals, cash donations, free merchandise, 
and a promise of jobs” for survivors that had lost everything to the storm (HUD, 2012). 
However, over time, the delay in “infrastructural investment” such as housing, schools, 
local businesses, or aid to rebuild for poor communities led to “poverty-stricken 
neighborhoods, major displacement, and even forced many people to move out of 
State” (HUD, 2012). Urban renewal projects, often times targeting poor neighborhoods, 
further exacerbated the issue by victimizing survivors and pushing them out. Hurricane 
Katrina, although physically catastrophic, established and catapulted the need for 
resilience in policies, plans, and multi-scalar government structures. Moreover, it 
highlighted the need for community-based resilience through innovative programming, 
local partnerships, and equitable community participation to spur more effective and 
longstanding change. 
 
Section 2.1 | Figure 4: Most homes in the seaside community were inundated by the ocean 
storm surge caused by Superstorm Sandy. 
Photo Credit: John Moore/Getty Images 
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Less than a decade later, on October 29, 2012, while the United States was still 
recovering from the shock of Katrina, Superstorm Sandy struck the coastal northeast. 
The storm caused unprecedented destruction as catastrophic storm surges wreaked 
havoc across the East Coast (Salvatore and Kattalia, 2012). Though Hurricane Katrina 
was deemed “deadlier” than Hurricane Sandy, Governor Andrew Cuomo termed the 
latter “more impactful” overall since its magnitude, size, and scale impacted a broader 
region. Hurricane Sandy was unique in direction and timing; the storm took a “left hook” 
turn into the coastal northeast, “striking at high tide,” when water levels were already  
“elevated five feet higher” than normal (M. Umberger, personal communication, January 
27, 2017). According to HUD’s Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy report, Hurricane 
Sandy became the largest Atlantic hurricane to hit the east coast, “costing over $65 
billion in damages and causing more than 200 deaths in seven countries, including 132 
deaths just on the US mainland” (HSRS, 2013).   
However, learning from past challenges in preparing for, and aiding recovery 
efforts after Hurricane Katrina, the federal government during Hurricane Sandy 
disseminated control to FEMA and subsidiary departments, and began to place staff 
and assets in the predicted impact areas before the storm made landfall. They also 
worked with state counterparts to coordinate potential emergency response and relief. 
And this time, “before the impending storm hit the east coast, President Obama signed 
emergency declarations for six states, allowing FEMA to directly transfer resources to 
state, regional, and local organizations to make the necessary community-adaptive 
preparations in advance of the storm” (HUD, 2012). FEMA was more proactive than 
reactive, and a special Hurricane Sandy rebuilding task force was created to minimize 
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disruptions, increase coordination among government agencies, and disseminate aid to 
local communities in a smooth and coordinated fashion. Individual states also did their 
part to anticipate response by “leveraging existing relationships with the private sector, 
community-based, philanthropic, media, and other organizations to communicate with 
residents and business owners to act as first-responders on the scene” (HUD, 2012). 
Local coordination and cohesion proved to be the most effective during this critical time. 
Looking back, Hurricane Sandy marked a significant shift in the way recovery 
and preparedness had evolved less than a decade since Hurricane Katrina hit. Though 
Sandy recovery revealed its own flaws, it demonstrated clarity within the federal 
government structure, and this in turn allowed for quicker access to federal resources 
and increased communication and partnerships between federal, state, and local 
agencies. Post-Sandy brought forth the topic of adaptation through learning, and the 
importance of resiliency efforts that had long been debated in academic, corporate, and 
policy circles. Most importantly, Post-Sandy marked a period in time where resilience 
terminology changed the way people began to look at disaster recovery. With 
hurricanes and flood risk on the rise, resilience in New York’s coastal metropolitan 
region no longer meant transforming things back to the way they were, but adapting and 






2.2 Growth of Resilience in Emergency Management 
 
  
Section 2.2 | Figure 5: Building resilience after Hurricane Sandy.  
Photo Credit: Emily C. Dooley, Oct. 2014 
To understand resilience as it is today, it’s important to see how the term has 
transformed over time. The term “resilience” was first used to describe the stability of 
communities and their resistance to external shocks. It is not only the ability of an 
ecosystem to return to its current state after a shock, but also how much disturbance it 
can withstand while still remaining within critical thresholds (Pelling, 2011). According to 
resilience expert Daniel Aldrich, resilience at the community level can be defined as “the 
collective ability of a neighborhood or geographically defined area to deal with stressors 
and efficiently resume the rhythms of daily life through cooperation following shocks” 
(Aldrich, 2015). 
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Many researchers have analyzed and drawn from narrower and broader visions 
of resilience to model conditions in urban planning, especially pertaining to communities 
recovering from shocks and stresses in the urban environment. Because regions are 
“complex systems of overlapping economies and social and political networks”, it is 
unsurprising that resilience has become a “key framework for analyzing regional 
capacity” (HUD, 2012). In the context of social resilience, Pelling argues that resilience 
is a community’s “ability to persist, to adapt,” and the ability of a system to survive and 
thrive in the face of disturbance (Pelling, 2011). This kind of social resilience offers 
stability and support within a community during the face of a disaster, and is 
advantageous during recovery and beyond. 
Mark Pelling’s framework of resilience is a great example, because he focuses 
on the term as a means of advancing forward, not just simply ‘bouncing back’. He 
speaks of adaptation as resilience – “a form that seeks to secure the continuation of 
desired systems functions into the future in the face of changing context, through 
enabling alteration in institutions and organizational form” (Pelling, 2011). Pelling’s 
classification of adaptation practices “identifies three levels of adaptation: resilience, 
transition and transformation” (Hordijk et al. Resilience) and this framework is very 
helpful in establishing the need for intersectional and interdisciplinary interventions that 
practice not only physical resilience through infrastructural changes, but also social 
capital, social cohesion and ecological resilience as well. It is important to critically 
analyze structure and community in places, because as we learn from disasters through 
technical resilience policies, whether we have truly learned or not from past lessons is 
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more nuanced, case-sensitive and requires more granular insight into organization and 
networks at the community scale.  
Hurricane Sandy marked a threshold for recovery that not only acknowledged the 
importance of multi-scalar resilience, but also the need for adaptive and transformative 
policy that would foster community growth at the local level. Disasters act as triggers 
that unveil inherent vulnerabilities and spur societies to reassess community assets, 
resources, and opportunities to advance the design and efficacy of vulnerable 
communities. The sudden destruction of physical infrastructure and archaic systems 
“enables significant reorganization of services and organizational structures to create 
more optimal measures” (NCBI), and dispense with those that may have been thwarting 
communities from reaching their full potential. By doing so, additional resources can 
then be carefully mobilized with the specific intent of assisting communities with needs-
based factors that are related to rebuilding mentally, socially, ecologically and 
physically.  
 It’s important to note that after Hurricane Sandy, resilience became a national 
priority, causing the release of many plans and policies focused on rebuilding affected 
cities and communities within the New York metropolitan region, with the mindset of 
building back stronger. Alternatively, Hurricane Katrina and Superstorm Sandy can be 
seen as lessons and influences on “ongoing practices that seize opportunities of 
reinvestment” to address long-standing problems that compromise the resilience and 
overall welfare of local communities (NCBI). Reports and plans like One City, 
Rebuilding Together from the Office of Housing Recovery Operations, SIRR Report 
from the City, Hurricane Sandy FEMA After-Action Report, and Mayor De Blasio’s One 
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New York – The Plan for a Strong and Just City, all worked to implement resilience on 
many scales to address issues from revamping policies to community building on the 
ground; however, many of these strategies lacked multiple benefits. As Moser 
addresses in his piece on Global Transformation in a New Global Urban Agenda, “while 
progress has been recognized in soft sectors, such as health and education, this has 
been less the case in hard sectors such as urban infrastructure, land and housing.” In 
efforts to strengthen this area, FEMA created an Innovation Team – “a multi-sector, 
cross-functional group made up of people from various backgrounds, including non-
profit and international organizations, volunteer groups, businesses, and government, 
as well as concerned community members- to creatively solve problems for survivors.” 
In addition, City agencies such as the Department of City Planning, New York City 
Emergency Management, Office of Long Term Sustainability (currently the Office of 
Recovery and Resilience), Housing Preservation Department, and the City’s Economic 
Development Corporation, employed new staff with expertise, cross-cultivated 
knowledge, and deployed their own recovery and resilience strategies City-wide to 
identify vulnerabilities in impacted coastal communities for multi-scalar resilience (T. 
Pawlowski, personal communication, February 21, 2017). This was crucial, because 
although policies and plans were being implemented to build resiliency, these measures 
were not solely survivor-centric; whether implementation of these policies into practice 
truly helped those vulnerable in the long term, always remained in question. While these 
efforts eased the recovery process for a large number of affected individuals, 




Section 2.2 | Figure 6: Most homes in the seaside community were inundated by the ocean 
storm surge caused by Superstorm Sandy and some remain damaged even a decade later. 
Photo Credit: Spencer Platt/Getty Images 
To this day, many Sandy-affected regions face numerous roadblocks and 
challenges, however increasing their resilience at the community level may enable them 
to better withstand and adapt to the shocks and disturbances they may experience in 
the future. According to HUD, it is proven that “regions that anticipate the many 
challenges of protecting and improving existing assets and resources” will do much 
more to guard against stresses (HUD, 2012) that will affect our most vulnerable 
residents, and thereby exhibit greater resilience in the long-term. This is important, 
because due to a warming climate and rising sea levels, coastal communities such as 
those in Red Hook, Staten Island, Coney Island’s shores, and Edgemere, are likely to 
experience more hurricanes, storms and flooding in the future. This puts coastal areas 
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within the flood zone as well as vulnerable communities in the region at high risk. In 
these cases, and more, it is evident that recovery policies and programs that simply 
address resilience through singular pathways for preparation or protection are not 
enough; further understanding and insight into how resilience programs and initiatives 
can provide multi-scalar efficacy to reap multiple benefits, need to be made.  
 Since Hurricane Sandy’s devastating landing on the northeast border of the 
Unites States, many established programs such as the Rockefeller Foundation have 
established resilience as a top priority. Programs like 100 Resilient Cities, an 
organization pioneered by the Rockefeller Foundation, and Rebuild by Design, the 
international design competition tasked by President Obama’s administration with 
developing innovative plans to protect New York from hurricanes like Sandy, are model 
organizations that strive to combine community-based design with collaborative 
research processes to create multi-faceted designs for long-term resiliency and growth 
(T. Eisenberg, personal communication, January 25, 2017). Rebuild by Design, through 
the Sandy Disaster competition in the aftermath of the hurricane, brought together more 
than 500 organizations - non-profits, universities, research academies - in cities and 
neighborhoods across the Metropolitan area, to collaborate in teams to map vulnerable 
floodplains, impoverished neighborhoods, and community assets; its main focus being 
to tackle challenges in ways that are community-driven, intersectional, and equitable in 
the way designs are produced, as they confront today’s problems and plan for future 
risks (T. Eisenberg, personal communication, January 25, 2017). And as they state as 
their mission, “one of the keys to building urban resilience is to take the most effective 
tools - tools that have worked in other places” and tailor them to different regions 
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depending on need (J. Colon, personal communication, February 14, 2017). Learning 
from past lessons helps hone generational skills to identify the best way to engage with 






















2.3 Purpose: Importance of Social Resilience 
 
 This first section will focus on the importance of a community-centric resilience 
approach, by analyzing existing literature and looking for links between policy, 
community integration, and disaster resilience. Many of the lessons learned from 
Hurricane Katrina and Superstorm Sandy have revolved around the importance of 
community sustenance and resilience, especially during the gap period immediately 
after the storm. In that crucial time frame, it was the strength of community organizing 
that produced the most effective results in terms of building the roots of resilience for a 
quicker recovery. While technical policies such as elevating structures or flood proofing 
homes are effective in producing tangible results, research shows that its the intangible 
elements such as social capital, social cohesion, and social networks that are the most 
difficult to cultivate on the ground, but are the most valuable in terms of sustainability 
and social resilience. Depending on the storm, physical infrastructural improvements 
and design processes are only as good as the communities that strongly advocate and 
compete for them. For historically fractured and severed communities, this means 
comprehending residents’ needs and putting more investment in civic infrastructure and 
programs that foster community, stewardship, and community organization more than 
anything else. As Keith Hinds, Mayor of Portmore, Jamaica, at the Global Platform for 
Disaster Risk Reduction said, “To meet the goals of building a resilient city, we will need 
to commit significant resources at the local level. To do so in the midst of the economic 
challenges and in the face of scarcity of resources, will not be easy. But we have no 
option, we have to do it.” 
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 New York City’s coastal neighborhoods face many unique problems compared to 
other disaster prone cities. Given residents’ reliance on public transit, geographically 
isolated communities like Red Hook and the Rockaway peninsula are especially 
vulnerable sites during emergencies (Williams, 2014). During Hurricane Sandy, 
mandatory evacuation orders were issued 20 hours prior to the storm, while public 
transportation – subways and buses – shut down approximately 12 hours in advance 
(M. Umberger, personal communication, January 27, 2017). This prevented many 
residents without vehicles, disabled, elderly, and children form evacuating easily, if at 
all. Additionally, due to a major power outage during the storm, bringing aid to these 
impacted communities became even more difficult when critical infrastructure was 
damaged or destroyed. However, the City sent emergency response teams to go door-
to-door canvassing to support basic life-sustaining needs, and implemented commodity 
distribution points for food, water, and service centers. The recovery after the storm 
made it readily apparent that social cohesion, social capital, and community 
organization were critical factors in determining how well and how quickly a community 
could bounce back. 
Social Cohesion 
Social networks are key in determining who recovers better, stronger, and 
quicker from disasters. Thousands of people whose homes were damaged by Sandy 
lived in coastal neighborhoods that lacked strong support networks or community 
organizations capable of mounting a large relief effort. According to Eric Klinenberg, 
author of Heat Wave, a social autopsy of disaster in Chicago, these areas tended to be 
poorer, less educated than typical New Yorkers, and often minority communities with 
 25 
weaker ties to their neighborhoods as well as to political power (Klinenberg, 2015). As 
Michael McDonald, head of Global Health Initiatives, observed, “what was actually 
happening on the ground was not under an incident command system, it was the fragile, 
agile networks that made a difference in situations like these. It’s the horizontal 
relationships like the ones we are building that create security on the ground, not the 
hierarchical institution.” Though governments, with their unmatched resources and 
capacity to coordinate large-scale initiatives, will do more than any other institution to 
shape our response to the climate crisis, Klinenberg believes that civil society will also 
play a significant role in determining who lives and who dies during disasters 
(Klinenberg, 2015). As planners, we can either develop robust social infrastructure in 
vulnerable neighborhoods that foster social networks, provide residents with 
accessibility to resources, and extend life both everyday and during disasters; or, we 
can confine resilience to complex rebuilding procedures, technical expertise, and longer 
recovery durations when flood waters come or sea levels start to rise. The latter pushes 
the process to extremes, admittedly putting tremendous stress and pain to already 
vulnerable populations and helping only those who can afford it. As Klaus Jacob, 
climate scientist at the Earth Institute, says, “we can’t keep rebuilding after every 
disaster, we need to pro-build with the future of climate change in mind.” Increasingly, 
governments and disaster planners are recognizing the importance of social 
infrastructure: the people, places and institutions that foster cohesion and support, and 
community resilience is now front and center in our approach (Kleinenberg, 2015). 
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Social Capital 
Using Bourdieu’s definition, social capital is viewed as “the aggregate of the 
actual or potential resources that are linked to possession of a durable network of more 
or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition” (Bourdieu, 
1985). And Lin further connects social capital to networks of relationships, defining it as 
“resources embedded in one’s social networks” that can then be accessed or mobilized 
through social ties (Lin, 2001). In times of crisis, these social networks prove most 
helpful in terms of short-term recovery and response.  
 
 
Section 2.3 | Figure 7: Robert Putnam’s social capital flows diagram  
Photo Credit: Putnam/Bowling Alone, The Collapse and Revival of American Community 
In his book, Bowling Alone, The Collapse and Revival of American Community, 
Robert Putnam argues convincingly that effective democratic governance depends on 
“social capital” - the connections among individuals and their social networks, and the 
reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them. Because social capital is largely 
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generated at the individual, local and community levels, planners working at the 
community, municipal and regional scales can play a large role in “fostering the social 
capital that will facilitate more effective and inclusive governance” (Putnam, 2001). 
Since community bonds and relations impact how individuals react in the face of 
adversity, any interventions in communities should be sensitive of these inherent 
networks in order to generate positive social value. Putnam observes that “people’s 
engagement, whether as individuals or in small groups, organizations, activities, or 
other means of social interaction, translate into participation in local government,” and 
ultimately into trust in larger governmental and institutional organizations (Putnam, 
2001). This is important to understand, since many struggling individuals Post-Sandy 
voiced feelings of distrust, betrayal, and animosity against current recovery and 
resilience efforts. Therefore, diversifying methods of community engagement to reach 
vulnerable and marginalized populations is highly important to foster equitable 
participation and trust. Though generating social capital isn’t immediately profitable, and 
federal grants allocate limited funds to this area, this method of strengthening inherent 
community networks has been proven time and time again to yield long-term benefit. 
 Daniel Aldrich in his book, Building Resilience: Social Capital in Post-Disaster 
Recovery, observes that “population growth, increasing inequality, migration and 
development in hazard-prone areas, specifically coastal regions,” place more people 
and poverty in harm’s way and exacerbates vulnerability. Natural disasters such as 
Sandy threaten the strength and stability of urban communities, yet the difference 
between resilience and disrepair lies in the capacity of a community’s social capital. 
Aldrich argues that In addition to having financial and physical assistance, communities 
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with an abundance of social capital were able to minimize the migration of people and 
valuable resources out of the area (Aldrich, 2012) while isolated individuals with fewer 
social ties were less likely to be rescued or take preventative action (Kleininberg, 2002). 
And though common disaster policy response to risks has been aimed at strengthening 
physical infrastructure - protecting assets, building up sea walls, elevating buildings, and 
conforming to building code - it is difficult to deduce if physical infrastructure will be able 
to reduce all risk and eliminate vulnerability; it will perform well for a limited timeframe, 
but struggling communities today demand even more. Furthermore, spending on 
disaster preparation is “highly dependent on political cycles,” not necessity (Healy & 
Malhotra, 2009) and when priorities change, communities are exposed to long durations 
of flux.  
Robert Putnam defines social capital broadly as the “features of social 
organizations, such as networks, norms, and trust that facilitate action and cooperation 
for mutual value” (Putnam, 1993). Combining Putnam and Aldrich’s definitions of social 
capital, research has shown that the most effective form of social capital is by bridging 
ties. Access to opportunity and information assist in long-term recovery, however ties to 
social organizations provide both connection to an organization that can provide support 
through institutional channels and potential informal ties to individuals who may not be 
accessible through bonding social capital due to social divides. This is not only helpful in 
providing assistance when local governments fail to do their part in the interim, but also 
points to the importance of building long-term community resilience as well.  
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Community Organization 
 Community organizing and community-based organizations (CBOs), have also 
largely been successful in maintaining a focus on resilience through an emphasis on 
disaster protocol and keeping residents committed to a cause (Debucquoy, 2015). 
Community organizing is when local groups partake in the actual process of building 
resilience through an actionable cause, which generates networks and trust. Community 
groups often get involved in research, capacity-building, or infrastructure projects by 
advocating their priorities and “having a say in how funding can better be allocated” to 
projects that serve and benefit the community (Debucquoy, 2015). And even though 
City and local agencies have found this to be crucial component in terms of community 
recovery and resilience, many struggling communities Post-Sandy lack the power, 
strength, or outreach to fully organize. In this thesis, we will analyze the Red Hook 
Initiative in Brooklyn’s Red Hook community, as an example of the strength and 











2.4 Organization of Study 
 The second section of this paper then dives into the institutional restructuring of 
agencies in New York City after Hurricane Sandy through interviews with public 
agencies, and highlights current influences and lessons learned from the storm. And the 
following chapter evaluates unique resilience projects in the Red Hook, Staten Island, 
Coney Island, and Edgemere communities, to provide examples of the robustness and 
potential of community organization in building local resilience. 
Selected interviewees covered an entire range of respondents with a stake in or 
involved in post-Sandy policy-making, community-based planning, or community 
organizing. Interview questions related to community organizing for disaster 
preparedness and resilience before, during and after Superstorm Sandy; work that 
communities are currently engaged in; types of community engagement; financing 
alternatives; as well as challenges faced in the process, to answer key questions related 
to the importance of community-based organization and community-centric resilience. 
All interviews were then analyzed through thematic patterning related to shifts in how 









Ch. 3 Findings 
 From the eleven interviews conducted during the course of this thesis, eleven 
major findings were identified that signify the organizational restructuring, reformulation, 
and lessons learned from distinct decision-makers and planners after Hurricane Sandy. 
Interviewees ranged from government officials, emergency management personnel, to 
policymakers, planners, and architects who helped facilitate policy, financing, or design 
interventions on the ground. These eleven findings demonstrate immense growth within 
these agencies, and exude challenges observed through the process of strengthening 
















3.1 Institutional Changes and Growth 
Lesson 1: Ensure Consistent Collaboration of City and Local Agencies 
Superstorm Sandy became the turning point for Federal disaster recovery, and 
for the local government and agencies in New York City that meant reorganizing, 
restructuring, and clarifying visions and goals. Thaddeus Pawlowski, an urban designer 
at the Department of City Planning states that, “the biggest challenge after Sandy was 
lack of coordination and collaboration, and in the aftermath of such a large shock, it was 
crucial that the City and related agencies were given discrete roles and responsibilities 
to ensure collaborative planning efforts were effectively addressing recovery and future 
storms” (T. Pawlowski, personal communication, February 21, 2017). Group 
collaborative efforts like PlaNYC and the SIRR report (Special Initiative for Recovery 
and Resiliency) were affirming in that the City of New York and the Mayor expressed 
their dedication and commitment to ensuring quick recovery and urgency for resilience 
in Sandy-affected communities across the coast. But what was more remarkable was 
the comprehensive process of several agencies working collectively on a very rapid 
planning process for recovery. These processes included hundreds of meetings, 
workshops with experts and technical consultants, and constant community 
engagement to build a basis of shared knowledge and resources. Collaboration with 
various stakeholders within communities enabled a much richer and resourceful 
process as well.  
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Lesson 2: Create Annual Hazard Profiles in Vulnerable Communities 
 Through these collaborations, zoning and land use were identified as crucial 
factors in determining hazards and vulnerabilities; and therefore, correlated government 
agencies should play a more active role in planning and engaging with communities for 
climate change. Additionally, collaboration with local experts, stakeholders, and 
invested members of the community with informal knowledge of inherent hazards and 
vulnerabilities of a place, could also be beneficial as the main engines for recovery and 
resiliency. In establishing community-based resilience, Jessica Colon from the Office of 
Recovery and Resiliency recommended from experience that “when hazard profiling 
communities, investigation needs to occur at a smaller level for physical defenses” (J. 
Colon, personal communication, February 14, 2017). We have to be granular on where 
the physical risks are to identify the best need-based interventions, given the specific 
set of vulnerabilities and stresses in that neighborhood. She explains that, “communities 
don’t possess a master vision, as topographies in the urban fabric differ due to the 
uniqueness of each community” (J. Colon, personal communication, February 14, 
2017). It is important not to generalize and carry over techniques, because hazards and 
vulnerabilities will most likely be different from one context to the next. However, if 
community members were trained to hazard profile along with technical experts, this 
would not only create local stewardship but would be extremely beneficial in terms of 
creating an active knowledge base and a common set of resources for to build from 
during emergencies. 
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Lesson 3: Strengthen Community networks and Community-Based Organizations  
 “Community-level success stories didn’t come from government actions, but 
came from individuals taking leadership roles within these communities or CBO’s 
stepping up to meet the needs of a community during a time of hardship.”  
         -Thaddeus Pawlowski 
After Hurricane Katrina it was clear to the New York City’s Emergency 
Management to create a coastal storm plan for New York City in the case of a similar 
storm in the future. The first time the City’s coastal storm plan was activated was during 
Hurricane Irene in 2011, when NYCEM issued mandatory evacuations for Zone A 
(Special Flood Hazard Area), the Rockaways, City Island, and Hamilton Beach. 
However contrary to predictions, Irene’s impacts shifted to upstate New York and there 
was minimal damage in Zone A, an area marked as high risk for flooding. Based on the 
memory of Hurricane Irene, many residents in high-risk areas were highly unprepared 
for the magnitude and force of Hurricane Sandy and were less willing to evacuate a 
second time. Hurricane Sandy, entirely different in nature from Irene, shook the City, 
shutting down infrastructure and transportation in many parts, and trapping vulnerable 
communities at the fringes (M. Umberger, personal communication, January 27, 2017). 
Melissa Umberger, a hazard mitigation project manager at the New York City 
Emergency Management (NYCEM), describes one of the Post-Sandy response 
protocols as “ad hoc” in nature, but necessary on the ground (M. Umberger, personal 
communication, January 27, 2017). During recovery, NYCEM deployed an operation 
called Support to Residents in their Homes (SRITH) now called the Post-Event 
Canvassing Operation (PECO), where teams went door-to-door canvassing, checking 
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up on individuals that couldn’t or didn’t evacuate and asking them what they needed. 
Operation SRITH, a collaboration between NYCEM, DOH (Dept. of Housing), Army 
Corps, and the National Guard, was ad-hoc and spontaneous but was essential to 
ensure people’s safety and well-being. Although the coastal storm plan was activated, 
the aftermath of Sandy underlined the necessity of strengthening community networks 
and organizations that could have replaced SRITH in many areas out of reach. And in 
areas lacking community organization, recovery highlighted the need to provide 
adequate services, resources, and training for people to help themselves. 
Lesson 4: Diversify Methods of Community Engagement 
 In hurricane-prone regions, communities are the first responders after major 
disasters, in terms of finding access to water, food, shelter, and electricity; thus, social 
cohesion and social capital are two areas that are vital to community recovery and 
resilience. While speaking with climate scientist Joyce Rosenthal from Columbia’s Earth 
Institute, Rosenthal expressed value in diversifying community engagement methods to 
reach vulnerable populations such as the elderly, disabled, minority, or NYCHA 
populations, that may not have the ability to voice their needs (J. Rosenthal, personal 
communication, February 5, 2017). Areas that lack community engagement or 
interaction, and are spatially fractured and divided, are hazardous environments for 
residents who become easily susceptible to risk due to lack of cohesion and networks. 
Finding ways to engage these populations as well, not only creates equitable recovery, 
but also has the ability to transform communities to prepare and resist better in the next 
storm. Therefore, efforts to cultivate social resilience through integrated, community-
 36 
driven projects that educate and protect residents in the process, is beneficial in 
preserving and nurturing communities to become more resilient. 
Lesson 5: Contextualize Projects Based on Community Needs, Priorities, and 
Culture 
 According to Elijah Hutchinson, the Vice President of Resilience at the New York 
City Economic Development Corporation (NYCEDC), resilience planning in New York 
City has become more holistic in the definition of what resilience means. Whether it’s a 
project in Red Hook, Coney Island, Lower Manhattan or Hunts Point, resilience highly 
pertains to the local context, community vulnerabilities, and community-specific needs. 
In the case of Red Hook, he explains that “resilience means not hindering the 
community from the waterfront” because it’s interconnected with people’s jobs and 
livelihood. In the case of Coney Island, “resilience is more about water quality, habitat, 
and ecology” and so projects like the Living Breakwaters project are exemplary case 
studies for resilience. In the case of Lower Manhattan where there is “constrained real 
estate, and where limited vertical integration can be made because of density, resilience 
is about providing world-class work and open space” for recreation and community. And 
at Hunt's Point, where the “City’s food distribution center is located, resilience takes the 
form of alternative power generation, micro grids, and renewable energy,” in an area 
prone to blackouts and power shutdowns post-disaster (E. Hutchinson, personal 
communication, January 23, 2017). Hutchinson describes that the variability and 
flexibility of community resilience that is sensitive to place, context, culture, and needs is 
an important lesson. Communities may vary in the way they envision resilience, yet that 
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is where the challenge and strength of resilience planning stems from - it is unique in 
every situation. 
Lesson 6: Engage Communities from Start to Finish to Guide the Process 
 Another important lesson learned was engaging communities from start to finish 
to guide the design process, gain feedback and create a transparent relationship that 
would prosper into community ownership of these projects. HPD, the City’s department 
of housing and preservation, is all too familiar with this lesson, as they worked closely 
with Edgemere residents on strategic buyouts and creating resilience against nuisance 
flooding in their community. Zachary Lemel, Senior Resiliency Office within the Planning 
Division of HPD, argues that, “the most important aspect of resiliency planning is being 
transparent and honest with communities about limitations in scope, zoning and building 
codes, feasibility of rebuilding, or in some instances buyouts of homes that were too 
damaged to be rebuilt, or are located too close to the floodplains” (Z. Lemel, personal 
communication, February 13, 2017). In areas like Edgemere, that deal with multiple 
vulnerabilities such as nuisance flooding, a poor economy, urban renewal and buy-outs, 
Lemel says that “carefully and precisely choosing areas for strategic retreat, and 
realizing what you have power over as a planner and what you don’t, is critical in 
building trust within a community; and that type of planning will ensure whether projects 
get implemented or not” (Z. Lemel, personal communication, February 13, 2017). The 
clearer you are about what you can offer the community and what your boundaries are, 
the more specific feedback and viability you can get with designing better projects, 
gaining investment, and acquiring more funding.  
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Lesson 7: Empower Communities by Leveraging Urban Assets to Create Social 
and Economic Value 
 Asima Jansveld, Principal at HR&A Advisors explains that with disasters like 
Katrina and Sandy, there has been “almost a decade of thinking about capital 
investments, infrastructure, and innovative approaches to making the most efficient use 
of resources” (A. Jansveld, personal communication, January 30, 2017). With 
infrastructure aging and disasters causing economic losses, it is crucial that resilience 
planners think of smarter ways of investing scarce capital, by using a combination of 
private and public resources. Jensveld argues that when you “creatively leverage urban 
assets to create social value,” you are empowering urban communities that are facing 
pressing resilience challenges, to think outside of the box (A. Jansveld, personal 
communication, January 30, 2017). The key is to help communities identify their urban 
assets whether it’s infrastructure, properties, streetscapes, or public space that may be 
developable as key anchor institutions and build out from there. An added incentive is 
having social impact investors, or groups that are interested in investments that don’t 
just provide a financial return, but also a social return. By creating social and economic 
value from existing assets, communities have the ability to attract public and private 
investors to invest and buy-in. Moreover, future generations are able to inherit the social 
value produced over time. Resilience through this lens means reimagining and 
repurposing existing and aging assets to tackle multiple problems for the future.  
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Lesson 8: Create Dynamic Adaptive Pathways for Flexible Investments 
Chief of Staff, Douglas Le from the Office of Recovery and Resiliency, provided 
insight into making flexible investments now with the knowledge of the lifecycle of those 
investments in its lifetime. Le argues that it’s “just as important to make longer-term 
hard investments thinking of future impacts and benefits, as it is making short-term soft 
investments for the immediate future of communities” (D. Le, personal communication, 
February 28, 2017). Having a project that does both is crucial in creating flexibility with 
the aim of promoting continual learning and adaptation in response to experience over 
time (Haasnoot, 2013). In areas like Edgemere where the City (HPD in particular) has 
barely begun cracking the surface in identifying infrastructural needs for today and in 
the future, the clock is ticking. In Edgemere, vulnerable populations currently reside on 
areas historically designated as tidal marshland, which risk homes (even if rebuilt) and 
more importantly people’s lives, if continually hit by storms. The City and HPD are 
grappling with issues like these to try and find ways to gather the funding to work 
strategically, by taking steps today to incrementally save for the future. It’s important 
that not only long standing flood risk infrastructural projects take place, but also that 
deep-seated community engagement processes and smaller social investments are 
made to mobilize a community to work towards building resilience in various phases, 
not just one.  
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Lesson 9: Create Multi-Faceted Projects that Reap Multiple Benefits of Social and 
Physical Value through a Layered Approach 
 Non-profit organizations like Rebuild by Design, are exemplary in the innovative 
design approaches they take in integrating resilience within communities. The program 
was inspired by a post-Katrina trend in recovery where outside designers and 
contractors created a community plan that was largely rejected by the very community it 
was intended. The process was “largely discredited” for involving local residents “too 
late” in the conceptual and design processes, and thus Rebuild by Design was born to 
create a more inclusive process of community engagement (L. Englum, personal 
communication, January 25, 2017). Tara Eisenberg, project manager on the RBD team, 
explains that their mission is to involve communities right from the start to create large 
social investments that would pay off in the end (T. Eisenberg, personal communication, 
January 25, 2017). Rebuild by Design is unique in that design problems aren’t seen as 
problems, but as challenges to break complexities and barriers within communities, and 
think innovatively and holistically at creating new forward-looking projects to combat 
climate change.  
When asked about the strengths of their local resilience projects, Englum 
explains that, “successful projects are ones that have strong community support” from 
community groups that are “fully active and present” (L. Englum, personal 
communication, January 25, 2017). Funding competitions provide incentives for 
community groups to activate and mobilize in fertile settings where active communities 
and innovative governments set the stage for experimentation and innovation. However, 
in many areas that lack the community support, therein lies the struggle in generating 
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those community groups and networks, which often times lead to futile outcomes. 
However, one way to look at this issue is through projects that take on a multi-layered 
approach and instill a multitude of benefits, buffering against failure (T. Eisenberg, 
personal communication, January 25, 2017). Multi-faceted projects that are extensively 
integrated within a community touch a chord with people, as projects themselves 
become assets and instill a sense of pride within the community, whereas piecemeal 
projects don’t necessarily create the same effect. 
Rebuild by Design projects consist of a combination of green and gray 
infrastructure that enhance and integrate the natural landscape into the urban fabric as 
much as possible in areas prone to flooding. With policymakers and planners facing the 
challenge of working with limited funds and scarce resources, Rebuild by Design is an 
example of an organization that is making thoughtful strides in treating local resilience 
as an opportunity for communities to see what is possible. The communities that thrive 
in the long run aspire to be more inspiring than enforcing, empowering the people 
throughout the process and making sure that needs are resolved where they existed, 
while adding extra components to ensure that the value of the investment is everlasting. 
Lesson 10:  Implement Smaller Social Projects that can be a Part of Capital 
Renewal Cycles or Capital Investment Cycles 
 Jamie Springer, Principal at HR&A Advisors a technical consulting firm, argues 
that “implementing projects that can be a part of capital renewal cycles or capital 
investment cycles” is highly beneficial for building resilience because it’s far less costly 
(J. Springer, personal communication, March 3, 2017). In a time where many private 
and public sectors lack the funding, incremental investments generate higher benefits 
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and value, but this requires behavioral modifications. Springer says, “we cannot just 
invest in large physical infrastructure, but need to invest in social and intangible 
interventions” within the community that have a more sustainable, long-term impact, that 
changes attitudes when it comes to way of living (J. Springer, personal communication, 
March 3, 2017). This enables local communities to equitably plan for resilience as well, 
a lesson still not being consistently applied across the board.  
 Post-Sandy, there was great intention to build capacities within communities, 
given that $90 million dollars in grant funding went to small businesses services that 
would enable local business owners to comply and adapt to regulations to recover. 
However, this funding was soon reduced to a $3 million dollar program due to inability to 
acquire proper paperwork and the complexities of working with small business owners 
at an individual level. Additionally, Springer explains, “it became very hard to hold 
technical conversations with local communities after a certain point” in the design 
process, and “money was always limited when it came to funding non-technical 
projects” or programs (J. Springer, personal communication, March 3, 2017). Springer 
argues, that there needs to be financing in cities to develop smaller, social initiatives in 
order to build community development capacities that are tied to major infrastructure 
projects, in order for projects to live longer and more sustainably. It is important for local 
residents within a community to be aware and incentivized in the long-term to adapt to 
protective measures such as razing and elevating buildings, but there has to be local 
capacity and knowledge building in the terminology and process as well. Here, Springer 
notices a trend, where “if there are large government investments in projects, then 
people are more open to talking about social components with the excitement about the 
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large, capital funds.” However, “if there are no government resources or funds allocated 
towards social capital, then communities continue to limit themselves” in terms of 
project investment and struggle (J. Springer, personal communication, March 3, 2017). 
He argues that New York City in particular managed to sustain continuity on 
large infrastructural projects, and while the majority of these long-term projects only 
have visible projections, objectives, and milestones - this process works very effectively 
in ensuring assets are protected and infrastructure is safe. However, on the community 
side, there is little “coherent capacity” from the City to help support those communities 
and neighborhoods that are still struggling (J. Springer, personal communication, March 
3, 2017), and that is because of a very uneven distribution of resources. The bottom line 
is that there needs to be a larger focus on creating equitable means of investment and 
capacity-building to ensure that communities are protected in the short as well as long 
term.  
Lesson 11: Create Avenues for Effective Communication and Easy Access to 
Resources for Knowledge Sharing 
 Marion McFadden, Vice President in Public Policy at Enterprise and a former 
HUD employee, shares her Post-Sandy experience stating that since there was a long 
delay between the hurricane hitting and funding being passed; and whether or not 
communities have federal funds attached to their projects, it is important for alternative 
methods of community protection and asset-management to be investigated (M. 
McFadden, personal communication, March 8, 2017). She emphasizes that it is not 
important to put back what was lost, if what was lost was risky to begin with; but, there 
is a need to make communities safer to live in, and fixing those challenges requires 
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community-scale conversations. McFadden states that though “social cohesion and 
community networks have proven time and time again to be most effective” immediately 
after a disaster, she admits that there aren’t many examples anywhere where the 
government is investing in social programs (M. McFadden, personal communication, 
March 8, 2017). People learn best when they see someone they can identify with, and 
facilitating connections between communities through policy may help introduce people 
to their own neighbors and create a buy-in level where professionals and technical 
experts are then introduced. McFadden suggests it is largely a political problem where 
there is a calculus of where to put investment, and the Federal government may be 
overstepping in this area, where authority over local decision-making and strategic 
planning should rather be given to local governments. The reality is that with every 
storm like Sandy, Federal funds are slowly drying up, and local governments need to 
start stepping up, to ensure that they are adequately prepared with resources and 
services to protect communities from future disasters.  
Conclusions 
After speaking with several agencies that played an integral role during and after 
Sandy recovery, it is evident that community-based organizations can be major 
contributors to building local resilience. Not only do they play an integral role during 
immediate short-term recovery, but also in the long-term by bridging social ties, 
fostering relationships, disseminating knowledge, and ultimately determining how 
capable a community and its constituents are in recovering and thriving from shocks 
and stresses. The interviews also portray several strategies to interact with communities 
through technical workshops, training, and community-driven projects that advocate for 
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a more community-centric approach to resilience planning, that devotes time and 
investment in developing stronger social ties and social capital. Though community-
centric approaches have already started becoming a priority in resiliency planning, 
many interviewees mentioned the minimal investment put into social infrastructure and 
community growth, due to larger infrastructural reliance and priorities. However, this 
distinction between physical and social resilience agendas needs to be reevaluated due 
to evidence that shows community resilience is better attained where local leaders are 
the catalysts for change. That is to say, resilience is a shared responsibility. When local 
residents are actively invested within their communities, and are provided with the 
adequate resources and skills, they in return become stewards and can ensure the 














3.2 Case Study Methodology 
These findings brought to light ways in which public agencies and organizations 
restructured priorities after the hurricane, the lessons they learned, and also outlined 
seven important elements that are integral to community resilience work. The following 
seven elements captured are: community organization, knowledge sharing, investment, 
public-private partnerships, capacity building, urban design and development, and 
cultural ties and networks. Though these elements may vary in capacity based on the 
type of resilience intervention, they are important criteria to evaluate the ways in which 
communities are engaged at a local level. It’s also important to understand that no one 
case is the same, and community resilience can be achieved through multiple strategies 
and outlooks pertaining to specific challenges and contexts.  
This next chapter will analyze four unique community interventions in the Coney 
Island, Red Hook, Tottenville, and Edgemere communities to highlight strategic ways 
community resilience can be achieved through the robustness of community-based 
organizations or lack thereof. These case studies were chosen based on their contexts, 
unique challenges after Hurricane Sandy, and the ways in which their communities and 
local stakeholders approached the issue of resilience after the storm. Each case study 
visualizes resilience in a unique way, and will highlight the extent to which the seven 
elements mentioned are present in these communities. Finally, recommendations will 
be provided that indicate best practices to promote institutional learning and community-
based resilience.  
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Ch. 4 Community Mobilization: A Case Study of Coney Island  
4.1 Sandy’s Impacts on the Coney Island Community and Response 
 
Section 4.1 | Figure 8: Coney Island landmarks are visible as crews work to place sand and 
restore the beach. 
Photo Credit: New York District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers/Flickr 
On October 29, 2012, Coney Island, one of the City’s poorest waterfront 
neighborhoods even before the hurricane, was heavily impacted by Hurricane Sandy’s 
torrential 14-foot storm surge. Murky waters from Coney Island Creek, the Atlantic 
Ocean and ruptured sewers, flooded thousands of apartments in seconds, along 
Brooklyn’s southernmost peninsula (Weichselbaum, 2013). Many neighborhoods were 
damaged, homes and local businesses were flooded, public services and infrastructure 
damaged, and its biggest asset and attraction, the Coney Island waterfront amusement 
park, was desolate after the storm. Hurricane Sandy highlighted the City’s vulnerable 
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entry points, with Coney Island Creek being the first breach point for the peninsula due 
to its low-lying edges and the strength of the surge (NYCEDC).  
 
Section 4.1 | Figure 9: Map of Coney Island Creek. 
Photo Credit: SIRR Report 
Coney Island Creek is situated between the Gravesend and Coney Island 
neighborhoods of Brooklyn, New York and was originally composed of two inlets: 
Gravesend Bay on the west and Sheepshead Bay on the east (NYCEDC). As noted in 
NYCEDC’s report, though the creek functioned as a strait connecting these two distinct 
water bodies in the 1960s, through industrialization and rapid urbanization, wetlands 
and the natural shorelines had been filled in. Due to historical changes in hydrology 
combined with the effects of low-lying topography and climate change, this area was 
extremely vulnerable to tidal flooding and storm surge even prior to the storm 
(NYCEDC). At Sandy’s peak, floodwaters reached a high of ten feet and caused the 
most damage to physical infrastructure and building systems. Due to transportation 
shutdowns and lack of community organization, the Coney Island community was 
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difficult to reach during this time of emergency, leaving many residents without 
electrical, heat, and limited options for food or aid (E. Hutchinson, personal 
communication, January 23, 2017). According to NYCEDC, over 5,000 businesses and 
30,000 employees were affected by the recovery aftermath of the storm  
In response to Sandy and in anticipation of future storms and sea level rise, the 
City formed the SIRR report in order to assess physical, social, and ecological risks and 
formulate a resilience strategy to alleviate those risks entirely. The June 2013 report 
titled, “A Stronger, More Resilient New York,” recommended 257 special initiatives to 
rebuild Sandy-impacted neighborhoods and make the City more resilient. Southern 
Brooklyn Initiative 5 of the SIRR report in particular, suggested “reimagining Coney 
Island Creek to strengthen and soften its fringe areas through wetland construction or a 
tidal barrier to mitigate storm surge and flooding.” New York City’s Economic 
Development Corporation (NYCEDC), the Mayor’s Office of Recovery and Resiliency 
(ORR), in coordination with the Coney Island community, City, State, and Federal 
agencies, led this study in particular to evaluate the feasibility of long-term flood 
protection for the Creek as well as its implications for the future (E. Hutchinson, 
personal communication, January 23, 2017). Local stakeholders and community 
residents played an integral part in providing insight, local knowledge, and expertise on 
what a resilient Coney Island Creek could be for the future.  
 
“The Creek is a crucial part of the Coney Island community and it is important that it 
continue to be an educational and recreational asset.”         
     (EDC, 2016) 
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The study is a key component of the City’s OneNYC vision, to ensure that New 
York City neighborhoods, economy, and public services would emerge stronger from 
the impacts of storms and future impacts of climate change. As noted by NYCEDC, the 
study area encompassed “residential, commercial, and industrial land uses - road, 
bridge, and rail infrastructure as well as parks and marine environments” and was 
developed into a shared resiliency agenda between the City and Coney Island 
community. It included both short-term investments and longer-term measures, 
complementing the over $2 billion dollar existing investment to make the neighborhoods 
of Coney Island safer (NYCEDC). For the purpose of this chapter, we will be looking 
into how community engagement tied to capital investment could empower and mobilize 









4.2 Historical Background and Community Dynamics 
 
Section 4.2 | Figure 10: People wait in line to collect food and water at a distribution point in 
Coney Island in the wake of Hurricane Sandy. 
Photo Credit: Mario Tama/Getty Images 
Coney Island’s community is very transient, possessing high levels of poverty, 
poor quality of housing stock and limited community organization. Before the storm, City 
data showed that “nearly one in seven Coney Islanders were unemployed, household 
income was approximately $31,000 per year, and one in four residents were 
impoverished” and could not afford to rebuild their lives (Weichselbaum, 2013). Here 
along the coast, many residents live in public housing, affordable housing (including 
senior housing), or middle-income co-ops; and according to 2013 FEMA data, after 
Superstorm Sandy hit, “more than a quarter of the area’s more than 48,000 residents” 
told officials that their homes were ruined beyond repair.  
 Springer describes Coney Island’s waterfront as a “poorly organized community 
with hardly any public investment after the storm” and a lack of community organization 
at the local level (J. Springer, personal communication, March 3, 2017). Coney Island’s 
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community illustrated the “frustrations and inertia” that turned the rebuilding process into 
“a nightmare” (Kensinger, 2014), where very little had changed during the course of 
recovery and rebuilding, leaving much of the landscape littered with boarded up homes, 
empty lots, and abandoned construction projects. A fractured, isolated, and poor 
community, Coney Island lacked pre-existing community cohesion and active 
organization, two components that would have otherwise been able to help the 
community regroup, resist, and recover from Superstorm Sandy in a more effective 
manner. Because of this issue, it was important for EDC and the ORR to consider 
alternatives to ensure that the Coney Island Creek’s study wasn’t its own patchwork for 
resilience, but part of a larger vision to function sustainably in the long-term. 
 Prior to Hurricane Sandy, the Army Corps was undertaking the Jamaica Bay 
Reformulation Effort, to identify a long-term solution for the Atlantic Ocean shoreline (E. 
Hutchinson, personal communication, January 23, 2017). This reformulation effort 
consisted of a long-term study of a tidal barrier across Jamaica Bay, but did not include 
input from South Brooklyn or the Coney Island community in its initial scoping and plan. 
According to the DEIS for the project, awareness of the need for a more “integrated 
approach” to Coastal Storm Risk Management (CSRM) opportunities in Jamaica Bay 
and surrounding communities increased after Hurricane Sandy in 2012, and as a result 
of the devastation, USACE was tasked to address “coastal resiliency” and “long-term 
sustainability” objectives in their plan (DEIS 2016). Seeing this as a social, ecological 
and economic opportunity to efficiently conduct a feasibility study for the Coney Island 
Creek as well, the City worked successfully with USACE to expand its Reformulation 
Study area to include the neighborhoods of Southern Brooklyn surrounding Coney 
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Island Creek. This would allow EDC and the City to work with USACE to incorporate 
community input concerning environmental, social, and community benefits (access, 
amenities), into their long-term reformulation plan for the shoreline. 
Hutchinson argues that in order for projects to move forward, “it is crucial to build 
social resilience along with physical infrastructure” since community coordination would 
be crucial to attaining local knowledge, spreading awareness, and building trust for 
project support (E. Hutchinson, personal communication, January 23, 2017). In this 
case, extensive community outreach involved identifying community needs, developing 
key questions, and benchmarking community priorities to inform the Army Corps’ work. 
Through several interactions and engagement workshops with community residents, 
EDC established a set of guiding principles that covered community priorities like, 
recreational spaces, educational opportunities, ecology and flood protection, and a low-
maintenance integrated flood protection system, to set a design standard and a list of 
priorities for the region; and in turn, this was helpful in providing a concept template of 
what the Coney Island community envisioned for resilience, and criteria to follow 
(NYCEDC). To accomplish these tasks throughout the process, EDC set up an active 
working group called the Coney Island Creek Committee, which consisted of local 
advocates for the waterfront, environmental advocates, and city wide waterfront 
advocates (municipal arts society, the aquarium), to perform hyper local research that 
would provide local input for EDC’s study (E. Hutchinson, personal communication, 
January 23, 2017). By taking a more community-centric approach to resilience planning, 
the City and EDC were able to better inform the Army Corps to alter their reformulation 
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work to incorporate Coney Island Creek and many other regions bordering the 























4.3 Coney Island Creek Study: Community Engagement for Capital Investment 
 
 
Section 4.3 | Figure 11: Coney Island today; and a rendering of the Creek with a series of tidal 
barriers.  
Photo Credit: NYC Economic Development Corporation 
For large long-term projects like the Army Corp’s reformulation work across 
Jamaica Bay, it is crucial that the Army Corps work with technical consultants and 
planners to study and incorporate the priorities and needs of the communities residing 
within their study area. However, Coney Island’s community is representative of several 
New York City’s waterfront communities where low-income, poor, and vulnerable 
communities are fighting for lower crime, better schools, open space, and transportation 
access; yet, they are not empowered with the authority to do so. Though policy 
improvements such as the resilience text amendment, Appendix G of the building code, 
propose technical engineering guidelines to elevate buildings that do not require local 
input, the institutional expression of community input is still imperative to informing and 
guiding studies and plans like EDC’s and the Army Corps’, in order to gain a more multi-
faceted perspective on what community-based resilience means (E. Hutchinson, 
personal communication, January 23, 2017). Without the City and EDC approaching the 
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Army Corps to alter its methodology to incorporate a more community-centric 
engagement style, the reformulation plan wouldn’t have had the richness of information 
and local knowledge it has today.  
Additionally, capital flood mitigation improvements such as the Army Corps 
reformulation work, decrease individual construction costs of rebuilding; thereby, 
reducing flood risk to help support the future development of community infrastructure, 
vital in an area like Coney Island where small retailers are needed. Reduced costs also 
serve to strengthen interest among retailers, investors, and developers thereby able to 
provide needed services, generating more jobs, and activating key area corridors (EDC, 
2016). Though areas like Coney Island face challenges related to poor connectivity and 
complex redevelopment conditions, there are opportunities for creative and 
interconnected solutions – especially where resiliency measures require reimagining 
and reexamining relationships that didn’t exist before. 
 By creating a more regional approach through community involvement, the City 
along with the community and the Army Corps were able to comprehensively visualize a 
solution with short-term as well as long-term benefits. Though the City along with EDC 
finished scoping for the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) just last December of 
2016, EDC maintains ongoing checkpoints with the community. Active working groups 
consist of the city council member, local community members, community board, and 
environmental justice organizations, that inform consultants on a consistent basis and 
actively convene to make sure the project goals are equitable and align with community 
needs and priorities (E. Hutchinson, personal communication, January 23, 2017). These 
working groups are critical to both decision makers and community members in the 
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recovery and resilience process, as members act as community liaisons and can better 
disseminate information, facilitate discussions, and spread awareness among neighbors 
in their community.  
 
Section 4.3 | Figure 12: Alliance of Coney Island community members. 
Photo Credit: Coney Island Alliance 
Activating community engagement pathways to inform resilience processes was 
crucial after the storm, but coordinating with community organization efforts from the 
start would’ve helped accelerate and alleviate the process of short-term recovery by 
providing access to the right resources in time of need. Due to a lack of community 
organization immediately after the storm, the Alliance of Coney Island, a small non-profit 
organization initially intended on marketing and recreation, formed to revitalize and 
improve the community in Coney Island. Over the past five years, in addition to its initial 
efforts providing neighborhood services such as the Coney Island Sanitation Team after 
Hurricane Sandy, the Alliance slowly expanded to “promote local business, encourage 
economic development, and coordinate Coney Island-centric events” to bring the 
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community together (Alliance for Coney Island). Spurred by the aftermath of the storm, 
Alliance for Coney Island became an organization dedicated to promoting a safer, more 
secure, cleaner and better functioning Coney Island, through local community job 
training, work placement opportunities, and interagency coordination to build local 
resilience. Although Hurricane Sandy devastated a poor Coney Island community, it 
revealed a critical need for community organization and engagement in an area that 
was isolated, split, and desperately lacking cohesion, networks, or funds.  
While the Strategic Plan for Coney Island continues, a great deal of progress has 
also been made by the City’s Coney Island Revitalization Plan, that includes: the 
opening of several sit-down restaurants, Coney Commons (a mixed-use residential 
building featuring a community center), design and construction of new stormwater 
collection sewers and streets, and public space improvements. Additionally, NYCEDC 
and its community partners, such as the newly formed Alliance for Coney Island, 
continually work to market and program Coney Island in addition to ongoing 
maintenance of the beach and boardwalk. To this date, the Alliance of Coney Island has 
proven to be an integral part of Coney Island life, by “promoting programming, 
marketing and tourism, community development, and advocacy and representation” 
(Alliance for Coney Island). As seen on their main webpage, “by expanding 
communication efforts, improving quality of life, strengthening connections, representing 
the local businesses, and advocating for equitable policies and resources”, the Alliance 
of Coney Island “strives to maintain and develop a Coney Island that is vibrant and 
resilient” for future generations.  
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Meanwhile, located within the same borough of Brooklyn, the community of Red 
Hook was dealing with its own set of challenges after the storm. Contrary to Coney 
Island, in the case of Red Hook, we will explore a context where community 




















Ch. 5 Community Organization: A Case Study of Red Hook, Brooklyn   
5.1 Sandy’s Impacts on the Red Hook Community and Response 
 
Section 5.1 | Figure 13: Red Hook, 1770; Hurricane Sandy storm surge; Red Hook, 2013 
Photo Credit: (L to R) Brooklyn Historical Society; USGS; Google Earth 
 
Red Hook, a dense low-lying coastal community in Southwest Brooklyn was 
inundated from all three sides of its coastline - the Upper Bay, Buttermilk Channel and 
the Gowanus Canal, the night Hurricane Sandy hit. As noted in the SIRR report, “most 
of Red Hook lies within the second-most hazardous FEMA flood zone,” where the water 
near Red Hook is “capable of rising up to three feet” in the event of a flood (SIRR 
Report. 2013). Adding to its vulnerabilities, the neighborhood, a mix of waterfront, 
industrial usage, public housing (Red Hook houses are the second-largest housing 
development in New York State) and new developments, including an IKEA, are 
spatially separated and cannot be directly accessed by subway (T. Pawlowsky, 
personal communication, February 21, 2017). Given that almost 80% of families with 
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children live below the poverty level in Red Hook, this was terribly concerning (RHI, 
2012). Two weeks after Sandy struck, thousands of the neighborhood’s residents were 
stranded and remained without heat and power, many local businesses were unable to 
reopen, and street sewers were overflowing with debris and murky water. According to 
Craig Hammerman, district manager for Community Board 6, which includes Red Hook, 
“there were no back-up generators” and the existing electrical and mechanical systems 
that were below ground had to wait until the ground dried and the equipment was 
retested before energy could be supplied. The trauma suffered by the community - 
especially those who lived in a NYCHA public housing complex - raised public policy 
questions about how the community would approach planning for storm-related surges 
and resiliency (Crean, 2012). However, Red Hook’s community organizations proved to 
be its most valuable assets before, during, and after the storm.  
 
Section 5.1 | Figure 14: Red Hook Initiative  
Photo Credit: RHI 
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Red Hook Initiative (RHI), a community-inspired and self-driven organization that 
strives to build social and economic resiliency, emerged to help its community during its 
time of need. “Creating Change from Within” is their motto, and RHI’s vision of 
“community building, networking, and creating social resilience” played a unique role in 
strengthening Red Hook’s future. RHI uses formal and informal strategic approaches to 
youth development and community building, that incorporate the field’s best practices 
using a survivor-centric approach. When Superstorm Sandy hit the Red Hook 
community, RHI deployed its pilot WIFI program within NYCHA housing, which became 
the primary communication platform for public housing residents, as they are deemed 
the most vulnerable during disasters (Tony, 2015). Even when power and cell networks 
blacked out across most of Brooklyn’s neighborhoods, Red Hook WiFi kept residents 
connected (Byrum, 2014). Through this community wireless mesh network, residents 
were able to locate where help was needed and where it was available, facilitating the 
distribution of food, blankets, supplies throughout the region. It was able to fabricate 
social cohesion in an area that is often overlooked and difficult to reach during storms of 
this magnitude. Though Red Hook WIFI may have been a small recovery effort by 
youth, it provided backup communication for elderly, disabled, and patient communities 
- vulnerable populations - that may have otherwise suffered immensely during and after 
the storm.  
Over the past three years, this innovative technology has “expanded to 15 
hotspots through the neighborhood, serving hundreds of Red Hook residents and 
visitors” - designed, installed, maintained, and promoted by young residents of public 
housing in Red Hook (Tony, 2015). With such growth, Red Hook Initiative and New York 
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Rising estimate that Red Hook WIFI will cover 80% of the commercial areas in the 
neighborhood in the future, making it the largest community-developed and maintained 
free WIFI program in the United States.  
 
Section 5.1 | Figure 15: Red Hook Wifi was implemented during Sandy for NYCHA residents. 
Photo Credit: RHI 
Red Hook WIFI has since partnered with The Beautiful Earth Group to enhance 
the stability and resilience of the network through solar backup energy, and have 
already proposed an innovative distributed mesh network with designed redundancy in 
the event of another power outage (RHI, 2015). According to Red Hook Initiative, “the 
expansion of Red Hook WIFI will be sustained by young residents of public housing in 
Red Hook, employed by RHI in a year-long paid tech fellowship that will help them enter 
the tech sphere through employment or continuing education.” What is inspiring is Red 
Hook Initiative’s capability as an organization to provide a platform for self-driven youth 
to explore and innovate for the betterment of society; and its unique community-inspired 
model of social resilience is what sets it apart. 
For the long term, Red Hook’s community is also working to implement an 
integrated resilient flood protection system that provides access to the waterfront while 
creating layers of defense during a storm. For many Red Hook residents, the waterfront 
is the source of job opportunity, livelihood, and a vital asset to the community; however, 
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the process of building resilience is not just through large physical infrastructure, but 
also in innovation and engagement practices that not only involve the community, but 
are spurred by them. The next two sections will delve into the strength of Red Hook’s 
community-based organizations and the extent to which they hold authority over 



















5.2 Historical Background and Community Dynamics 
  
A historically vibrant and diverse community in South Brooklyn, Red Hook was 
once a thriving industrial town with a rich maritime history as one of the world’s busiest 
ports. Many dockworkers, labor workers, and their families lived in this area once, with 
industrial warehouses, manufacturing, and commercial uses lining the waterfront (T. 
Pawlowski, personal communication, February 21, 2017). However over time, due to 
rapid urbanization, many of the City’s poorest populations were forced into urban 
fringes, and Red hook quickly became the site of the second largest public housing 
complex in New York City, bringing in wide socio-economic disparities and issues which 
reached their peak in 1990 (Wolff, 2013). Known previously as the community of last 
resort, artists began setting up studios and lofts in warehouse-type structures, small 
business owners opened mom n pop shops on street corners, and few destination 
weekenders trickled in for an urban escape (T. Pawlowski, personal communication, 
February 21, 2017). Due to location, several Red Hook residents struggle most of the 
year due to cold weather, inconsistent business, and unstable income (Eisenhardt, 
2013), and Hurricane Sandy only exacerbated the poor conditions and impacts felt by 
this community. 
 Though spatially divided and financially challenged, the majority of Red Hook’s 
strength comes from its community-based organizations that have sprung up over the 
years through its close-knit community. Red Hook Initiative, Red Hook Community 
Justice Center, and Red Hook Hub, are just a sample of the community’s longstanding 
local partners that take part in creating integrated social and economic resilience for the 
community. These community-based organizations are centered on the belief that to 
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overcome systemic change, social change begins with empowering and nurturing youth. 
By empowering young residents with access to services, new skills, and a chance to 
develop as leaders, the community chooses to invest in its own to pull themselves out of 
poverty. Red Hook’s community-based organizations believe that instilling a sense of 
ownership and belonging to residents is the basis of healthier, more innovative, and 
therefore more resilient communities. By tackling disasters through multi-pronged 
approaches, communities can achieve resilience directly related to climate-issues and 
indirectly through innovative responses to vulnerabilities. 
 
Section 5.2 | Figure 16: Red Hook Justice – your community, your court. 
Photo Credit: Red Hook Justice 
 In 2000, the Red Hook Community Justice Center became the nation’s first multi-
jurisdictional community court, with a mission to solve neighborhood problems with 
unique community-based sanctions and services. This courthouse became the hub for 
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an array of unconventional programs that contribute to reducing fear and improving 
public trust in government. In a community like Red Hook, with many vulnerable 
residents already marginally excluded from the status quo, the Justice Center’s 
unconventional programs provides unique alternatives for building community 
resilience. According to Red Hook Justice, to some, “the center is their classroom where 
they earn their degrees; to others, it is where they resolve their conflicts with families or 
neighbors; and for some, it is a place to hone leadership skills or a safe haven to 
receive needs-based support and opportunity” to get back on the road to recovery. 
 In 2002, the Red Hook Health Initiative began as a program of a local hospital, in 
response to the severity of health and social issues in Red Hook (RHI, 2016). And in 
2006, the Red Hook Initiative, an independent nonprofit, formed to expand their scope 
to focus on community needs. Through this platform, the Red Hook Local Leaders 
program was launched in July 2014, to bring local residents together to improve 
individual and family preparedness, as well as strengthen the social resiliency of public 
housing residents. Training programs ensured that residents living in these precarious 
facilities gained the “proper knowledge and skills required for emergency response,” 
and to become “community leaders of the first response and recovery teams” of any 
future emergencies or disasters (RHI, 2016). Since the creation of this program, RHI 
has trained 175 local leaders, the majority of whom are residents in Red Hook houses 
themselves. Training topics range from Ready New York, CPR/First Aid certification, 
Heat and Health Preparedness, to Psychological First Aid, Coordinating with 
Government Agencies and much more (RHI, 2016). These programs were derived from 
pinpointing the roots of Red Hook’s vulnerabilities – poverty, crime, health and social 
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issues - and transforming them into opportunities to build strength and social resilience 






















5.3 Red Hook Initiative: Strength of Community Organization 
 
 
Section 5.3 | Figure 17: Red Hook Initiative community members actively engaged at a meeting. 
Photo Credit: RHI 
The same determined spirit and genuine concern for neighbors that was seen in 
Red Hook in the days after Hurricane Sandy, can still be visible and growing stronger 
(Eisenhard, 2014). Over the years, Red Hook’s community organizations and local 
stakeholders have proven to be a force to reckon with, even on larger platforms 
advocating for community needs and priorities. At a panel at NYU’s Rudin’s Center for 
Transportation, AECOM – a large construction firm - proposed a plan to transform the 
entire Red Hook neighborhood to mitigate flooding and storm surge while spurring 
development. AECOM’s ambitious vision included “thousands of new apartments in the 
neighborhood along with storm resiliency infrastructure along the waterfront, a creation 
of a new subway line that would extend to South Ferry, improvements to Red Hook 
Houses, and sprucing up the existing streetscape” in the neighborhood (Warerkar, 
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2016). However intriguing as a plan, it was highly contested for lacking community 
outreach and involvement. Although Chris Ward, the New York Chief of the company, 
reiterated the fact that “the vision wasn’t a proposal but the start of a conversation,” 
many local Red Hook stakeholders explained concerns about a “development of this 
scale and the lack of community outreach” to Red Hook’s robust community 
organizations, while envisioning this plan (Warerkar, 2016). Michelle de la Uz, a City 
Planning Commissioner and director of Fifth Avenue Committee in South Brooklyn, 
argued that, “though the project was multi-faceted, the lack of community engagement 
and initiation earlier in the process” would prove detrimental in gaining project support in 
the end (Warerkar, 2016). The panel demonstrated that though multi-faceted 
infrastructural growth is a key component to resilience, without consistent community 
collaboration and support, it would be difficult to determine the sustainability and viability 
of such projects in the long-term. Without the community at the forefront spearheading 
these large efforts, visions like AECOM’s will stay visions, as long as community 
organizations and local stakeholders stay true to their values. 
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Section 5.3 | Figure 18: Red Hook Initiative local youth leaders. 
Photo Credit: RHI 
The Red Hook community is unique in that it has made social and behavioral 
modifications by investing in its youth, its residents, and its strong community network 
through nuanced interventions that have a more sustainable and long-term impact. 
Though the Mayor’s Office of Recovery and Resiliency (ORR), with support from 
NYCEDC, is working with local stakeholders to advance resiliency in Red Hook through 
a federally-funded integrated flood protection system (EDC, 2016), infrastructural 
designs like these are decades long projects that are implemented in phases, or are 
modified due to funding constraints over time. If an integrated flood protection system is 
necessary and will act as a primary defense to mitigate storm surge and flooding, then 
Red Hook’s community members, social networks and cohesiveness are its subsequent 
layers of defense, and require equal investment if not more.  
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Resiliency visions for southwest Brooklyn, like AECOM’s, may be “a new way of 
designing cities,” but these visions need “further refinement” in how they consider, 
communicate with, and represent “the public” they intend to design for (AN, 2016). They 
require an advanced understanding of “vulnerability” and “equity” as they seek to build 
resilience in designing adaptation plans (AN, 2016). In this process, the strength of 
community-based organizations is essential to combat the politics behind physical 
resilience, and ground projects in a way that ensures needs are properly met. In the 
case of Red Hook, its community, local leaders, and youth are the ones spurring 
change to ensure that long-term resilience measures are designed appropriately, and 
put in place.  
The past two case studies have shown interventions where community 
engagement efforts inform capital investments, and where community organizations 
focus on social resilience while advocating for proper capital infrastructural projects. 
However, we will now look at a case where the two are merged in an innovative 










Ch. 6 Community Engagement: A Case Study of Tottenville, Staten Island   
6.1 Sandy’s Impacts on the Tottenville Community and Response 
 
Section 6.1 | Figure 19: Hurricane Sandy decimated Staten Island homes in Tottenville 
Photo Credit: Maureen Donnelly 
Tottenville, a community located on the southernmost shores of Staten Island, an 
area susceptible to wave action and erosion, was severely ravaged by Hurricane 
Sandy’s storm surges and subsequent floods. As reported in the EIS, “peak storm tides 
in Tottenville measured approximately 16 feet, almost five feet higher than at the Battery 
in Manhattan, killing a record 23 residents” (more than any other borough) while 
destroying many homes and small businesses along Tottenville’s coastline (EIS, 2016). 
The fast-moving storm ravaged the southern and eastern shorelines of the island 
bringing a “deluge of physical, financial, and emotional hardships,” where “roughly 16% 
of the borough was inundated with flooding that impacted approximately 75, 651 
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residents” in total (DeJohn, 2013). According to a City report, Staten Island contained 
the “highest percentage of people living within the floodplain,” damaging people’s lives, 
critical infrastructure, and community spirit. Following the storm, the City’s SIRR report 
and PlaNYC, documents that outlined strategies to increase resiliency citywide, 
contained “Community Rebuilding Resiliency Plans for five particularly vulnerable 
neighborhoods in NYC, one of which studied the East and South shores of Staten 
Island” (SIRR, Report, 2013). The Plan highlighted specific initiatives that addressed 
“coastal protection, critical infrastructure, social and economic recovery,” to examine 
possibilities for coastal protection as well as waterfront accessibility in the future; and, 
examined the underlying geomorphology and soils of various regions as well. What the 
plan also revealed that was the South Shore was particularly vulnerable to coastal 
erosion that would not only cause persistent damage to infrastructure close to the 
water’s edge, but also adversely affect the soils and diverse aquatic biota in Raritan Bay 
(AKRF DEIS, 2015).  
Coastal Protection Initiative 15, recommended in the Community Rebuilding 
Resiliency Plan for the East and South Shores of Staten Island, called specifically for 
the implementation of a “living shoreline project” along with Coastal Protection Initiative 
24, which called for “USACE to work with the City” to complete its longstanding study on 
the shores and develop a plan for beach nourishment” after extreme weather events 
(AKRF DEIS, 2015). In June 2013, HUD launched Rebuild by Design, a competition to 
respond to Superstorm Sandy’s devastation through innovative design proposals that 
had the opportunity to win CDBG-DR (Community Development Block Grant - Disaster 
Recovery) funding as well as other public and private-sector funding sources, for 
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affected communities in need (T. Eisenberg, personal communication, January 25, 
2017). After a yearlong community-based design process, which involved design teams 
meeting with government entities, elected officials, issue-based organizations, local 
community-based organizations, and individuals within the Staten Island community, 
HUD announced the winning Living Breakwaters Project led by SCAPE (T. Eisenberg, 
personal communication, January 25, 2017). With $60 million of CDGB-DR program 
funds, the Breakwaters Project would implement a layered resiliency approach to 
strengthen Tottenville’s shoreline, by promoting risk reduction through erosion 
prevention, wave energy attenuation, and enhancement of ecosystems and social 
resiliency (AKRF DEIS, 2015). Additionally, the NY Rising Community Reconstruction 
Program, established by the State to provide rebuilding and revitalization assistance to 
communities severely affected by Sandy, proposed the Tottenville Dune Project that 
would implement a stone-core dune with plantings, as secondary defense strategy to 
the living breakwaters (AKRF DEIS, 2015). This method of creating multiple barriers of 
protection is what makes this Rebuild by Design Project extremely successful from an 
infrastructural standpoint. But to understand its entire resilience potential, it’s important 







6.2 Historical Background and Community Dynamics 
 
 
Section 6.2 | Figure 20: Seaside village of Tottenville in the southwestern shores of Staten 
Island. 
Photo Credit: Henry Gannett and Marcus Baker/US Coast and Geodetic Survey 
 The village of Tottenville came in existence around 1840, with an economy and 
culture surrounding oyster fishing, shipbuilding, ship repair, and agriculture. It became 
the “largest town in Westfield, the historic name for this part of Staten Island, and 
though the community has advanced over time, the feeling of a small coastal town still 
prevails today” (Shepherd, 2008). Between 2000 and 2011, the City Planning 
Department reported that Staten Island currently had the smallest immigrant population 
(99,000) of all the City’s boroughs, although it sustained “the highest percentage growth 
among the foreign-born, increasing 36%,” where over one-third of the borough’s foreign-
born residents were Caucasian and came from countries in Europe, like Italy, Russia 
and Poland (SI Advance, 2015). Next, are borough residents born in South Asia, mainly 
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India, Pakistan, mainland China, etc who account for another 30% of the foreign-born 
population (SI Advance, 2015). Contrary to the past two case studies, Tottenville 
consists of a largely white and affluent community, and provides an example of an area 
that lacked community-based organizations, but possessed the capital resources, 
investment, and political support to gain physical and social resiliency after the storm (L. 
Englum, personal communication, January 25, 2017). However, this case study also 
demonstrates that regardless of socio-economic background, community organization is 
critical and could have been more beneficial for immediate recovery. Though the 
community was cohesive and had access to resources, its socio-economic isolation and 
lack of ties to surrounding organizations within Staten Island, prevented the Tottenville 
community from a better recovery during and after the storm. It was through this need 
for community organization that a long-term community-centric defense scheme was 
proposed. 
 
"The project team understand that you cannot keep back coastal flooding in the context 
of climate change, but what you can do is ameliorate the force and impact of 100 and 
500-year storm surges to diminish the damage through ecological interventions, while  
simultaneously catalyzing dialog to nurture future stewards of the built environment." 
- Fuller Challenge juror Bill Browning (SI Advance, 2015) 
 
           Tottenville’s Living Breakwaters, through its $60 million dollar grant, is a very 
innovative defense scheme that provides layers of coastal protection, while keeping the 
community and people as its focal point (L. Englum, personal communication, January 
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25, 2017). The accessible and interactive layout of the Breakwaters is intended for 
current and future generations to explore them, to learn from them, and immerse 
themselves in marine life (Lo, 2015). The Living Breakwaters is an example where 
educational components are at the heart of community involvement plans, and 
partnerships with the neighboring New York Harbor School and the Billion Oyster 
Project help to educate the surrounding community and youth about preserving marine 
ecology (Rebuild by Design, 2016). The Living Breakwaters acts as a coastal defense 
mechanism, which also “aims to restore a billion live oysters to New York Harbor,” an 
area that has been barren of oysters for years due to overharvesting, dredging, and 
water contamination (Lo, 2015). The project is driven by a series of ‘water hubs,’ the 
first of which is built along the Tottenville shoreline. The first hub at Tottenville “consists 
of basic services for beachgoers, hosting classrooms, a wet lab for the New York 
Harbor School, flexible meeting spaces, a bird watching station, as well as storage 
facilities,” to help drive local engagement and economic opportunity to an area still 
recovering from the devastation of Sandy (Lo, 2015). Not only does this project cater to 
Tottenville’s direct needs, but after a disastrous storm like Sandy, it also reconfigures 
people’s relationships with their marine habitats into one that embraces nature and is 





6.3 Breakwaters Project and Rebuild by Design:  
Community Engagement and Integration 
 
Section 6.3 | Figure 21: Living Breakwaters project. 
Photo Credit: Rebuild by Design in partnership with 100 Resilient Cities 
 Rebuild by Design’s Living Breakwaters project utilizes the assets and strengths 
of the Tottenville community in Staten Island to build local resilience. The community’s 
willingness to encourage and foster an ambitious project like the Living Breakwaters is a 
testament to how open and active the community was to initiating resilience measures 
as well (L. Englum, personal communication, January 25, 2017). The core purpose of 
the design according to Rebuild by Design, was to “consolidate addressing Sandy’s 
impacts, shoreline erosion, coastal flooding, and future sea level rise into one project 
that improves access to the water’s edge, enhances community stewardship on and off-
shore,” and increases access to educational and recreational activities. The project 
creates flexibility through multi-purpose functionality and integrates resilience through 
physical and social layers.  
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Section 6.3 | Figure 22: Living Breakwaters project - building ecological resiliency. 
Photo Credit: Rebuild by Design in partnership with 100 Resilient Cities 
 
 
Section 6.3 | Figure 23: Living Breakwaters project – building social resiliency. 
Photo Credit: Rebuild by Design in partnership with 100 Resilient Cities 
 
 81 
The Living Breakwaters is multifaceted and consists of "(1) a 3/4 mile long 
system of specially designed breakwaters that include active habitat enhancements on 
the breakwater system and in the waters surrounding it, (2) oyster cultivation and 
activities supporting oyster restoration including oyster hatcheries and setting facilities, 
shell collection and curing, and oyster nurseries, (3) a water hub to serve as a public 
facility providing space for programming, and (4) interactive programming including 
educational, stewardship, and capacity-building activities related to the project 
components” (Rebuild by Design). What makes this project as successful as it is in 
scope and practice, is not only its physical coastal landscaping, but also its social 
learning aspect that functions as a fundamental component of adaptation (Hordijk et al. 
Resilience). Ultimately, the Living Breakwaters seeks to instill a sense of social 
responsibility through awareness and learning; it fosters experimentation and innovation 
in such a way that it transcends its duty as a living barrier. And in terms of community 
development, the community itself is engaged through interactive design workshops, 
council meetings, shore walks, and beach clean-ups, in order to carry out the project’s 
purpose, so that it is streamlined into education and residents’ daily lives. 
 There is no one case that fits all scenarios when it comes to building resilience, 
 
so identifying a community’s assets, local networks and partnerships, while designing 
 
projects that reap multiple benefits, is crucial to generating the kind of flexibility and 
 
strength that empowers impacted communities. Rebuild by Design’s methods in Staten 
 
Island’s South Shore Living Breakwater’s project, not only promote local resilience for 
 
recovery, but also foster a sense of community and growth, that has the ability to spur 
 
long-term transformative change for the future (Braud & Siedman). Accessibility, 
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comfort, communication, and investment are all important building blocks for resilience, 
 
and to some degree can indicate whether or not a community is susceptible to  
 
disasters. However, connecting with the community and creating bonds through design  
 
is even more fruitful in the long term.  
 
 
Section 6.3 | Figure 24: Living Breakwaters project – engaging communities. 
Photo Credit: Rebuild by Design in partnership with 100 Resilient Cities 
Researchers have proven that the compounding of smaller-scale investments 
and coordinated projects that ensure basic quality of life and community development 
are crucial in the revitalization of an entire city, and the Living Breakwaters embodies 
those best practices. Ultimately, it is important to recover in ways that empower the 
community, strengthen citizen participation and establish clear communication between 
sectors to effectively build long-term efficacy. The aftermath of such devastating 
hurricanes and disasters serve as lessons and reminders that resilience is simply a 
function of the strength of a community (Remes, 2015). And if adequate measures are 
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taken to integrate values and investment within a community, long-term sustainability 
and longstanding resilience can be achieved. Rebuild by Design’s Living Breakwaters 
project was key to building a long-term resilience vision for the Tottenville community, 
and construction is expected to begin by June 2018. However, Rebuild Design 
colleagues Englum and Eisenberg, both acknowledge that the project could not have 
been possible without collaboration with nearby community organizations that came 
together; the Billion Oyster Project, the Tottenville Civic Association, the Tottenville 
Historical Society, the NY/NJ Baykeeper as well as the city Parks Department, all 
played an integral part in the process. Without these community-based organizations 
constantly involved and engaged in the social and physical aspects of the project, the 
Living Breakwaters wouldn’t have the richness, capability, or resilience layers that it has 
today.  
However it raises the question, that in fractured communities that do not possess 
any of these critical components for resilience, how do we as planners build value and 
investment? The next case study will examine the Edgemere community on the 
Rockaways, and how resilience can be detrimental in many ways, if strategic and 







Ch. 7 Community Cultivation: A Case Study of Edgemere, South Queens 
 
7.1 Sandy’s Impacts on the Edgemere Community and Response 
 
Section 7.1 | Figure 25: Long neglected Queens neighborhood of Edgemere.   
Photo Credit: Nathan Kensinger/NY Curbed 
Edgemere, a low-lying waterfront community built on historic tidal marshland on 
the Rockaways Peninsula, experienced a unique challenge following the destruction 
that Sandy brought forth. Edgemere’s high water table and flat topography made it 
extremely susceptible to the storm; here, New York City photographer, Nathan 
Kensinger describes, “streets were intensely flooded, many beachfront businesses and 
residents were completely dismantled and destroyed, and the Edgemere boardwalk was 
ripped from its concrete roots and thrown inland into houses and front yards” 
(Kensinger, 2012). Residents of Edgemere survived, however most if not all residents 
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lost their houses and properties, their biggest assets, to the storm. Living on a low-lying 
topography like Edgemere, many residents were forced to flee to higher ground without 
any of their possessions, to avoid getting swept in by the waves or injured in the 
process (Z. Lemel, personal communication, February 13, 2017). Making matters 
worse, in addition to the MTA removing train service off the Rockaway peninsula prior to 
the storm, the A train crossing over Jamaica Bay, south of Howard Beach station, was 
completely decimated which cut off any possible bus service or transportation 
(DelMundo, 2012). Half a million people were disconnected, marginalized, and left over 
to survive on their own after Sandy, crippling the entire peninsula and exacerbating the 
storm’s events in the region (Z. Lemel, personal communication, February 13, 2017). An 
area physically and socially outcasted from the rest of the City, with scattered 
community organizations, residents of the Rockaways were simply left to fend for 
themselves in the face of disaster.  
This case study demonstrates not only the debate over providing physical 
infrastructure resilience in areas like Edgemere, but also the need to unify and rebuild 
trust within a fractured community, to tackle challenges ahead. This last example 
highlights the urgency for transparent communication and engagement throughout the 
physical rebuilding process, as well as the need for community-based programs that 
educate and inform Edgemere’s residents, especially youth. In an area where sea level 
rise could potentially decimate this waterfront community in the near future, both 




7.2 Historical Background and Community Dynamics 
 
Section 7.2 | Figure 26: Edgemere, South Queens study area. 
Photo Credit: Wall Street Journal 
For many Rockaway residents, the peninsula has been seen as the City’s 
“dumping ground” for unwanted public and institutional uses and waste. Public housing 
on the peninsula arrived as a means to provide housing for the poor displaced by urban 
renewal by locating it on cheap, underutilized land at the city’s fringes (Debucquoy, 
2016). Many of the City’s poorest residents have been pushed out to the peripheries 
into the Rockaways, and even within the Rockaways lies a “polarity” or a disparity 
between the more affluent western and far poorer eastern (Far Rockaway) ends of the 
peninsula (Debucquoy, 2016). Historically a fractured and socio-economically divided 
community, an inherent lack of trust and connection persists among residents as well as 
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organizations in the Rockaways, to invoke any possibility of collaboration for resilience 
action (Z. Lemel, personal communication, February 13, 2017). As Pawlowski and 
Debucquoy describe, “many of the recovery groups that had formed during the recovery 
phase dispersed after internal political conflict in which power dynamic and issues of 
mistrust prevented the community from working together efficiently”; yet, without 
community cohesion and organization the community would suffer immensely in the 
future.  
 Since the 1990s, Edgemere’s community has existed as an urban renewal site, 
giving the City of New York ability to buy-out property in order to develop housing, 
parks, and open space for the community (Z. Lemel, personal communication, February 
13, 2017). However, Edgemere’s 1997 Urban Renewal Plan, which created a 
“framework for a $100 million investment in street and sewer improvements as well as 
700-units of housing,” failed to fulfill community needs and lacked the infrastructural 
improvements to face future climate change risk (HPD, 2016). The Urban Renewal Plan 
was thus incomplete and stalled, and only approximately 307 one- and two- family 
homes were constructed (HPD, 2016). Since then, the Edgemere community has been 
left “plagued with vacant city-owned land and abandoned blighted structures,” which 
has led to a “domino-effect of disinvestment” in properties and limited opportunities for 
the predominantly low-income population of Edgemere (HPD, 2016). Years of distrust 
and loss of faith in government have made Edgemere residents wary of City promises 
(Z. Lemel, personal communication, February 13, 2017); and therefore, any future 
efforts to build resiliency would have to involve policymakers cultivating trust, support, 
and stewardship within the community. 
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7.3 Resilient Edgemere: Cultivating Cohesion, Capital, and Organization 
     
  Section 7.3 | Figure 27: Collaborative community meetings took place for Resilient Edgemere.   
  Photo Credit: HPD 
Rooted in these values, The Resilient Edgemere Community Planning Initiative 
presented a joint effort of New York City agencies to align New York City’s Sandy 
recovery and rebuilding investments in Edgemere with a comprehensive long-term 
community vision, to avoid paralysis of this community again. With the Department of 
Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) owning over 50% of the properties in 
Edgemere, there was a unique opportunity to align existing resources, and identify new 
ones to collaborate and develop an integrated plan (HPD, 2015). HPD’s senior 
resiliency officer, Zachary Lemel, explains that the current acquisition program is two-
pronged; either the City buys property (they will not develop) that residents want to sell 
to put restrictions on them, or they will acquire sites with limited damage to redevelop 
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into affordable housing (Z. Lemel, personal communication, February 13, 2017). 
However in a region where future climate change would make Edgemere unlivable 
without comprehensive intervention, strategic buy-outs on where to reinforce and 
where to retreat were important to realize. Lemel states that through the buy-out 
program, “residents that are displaced would receive temporary relocation and 
assistance,” to ensure that the community at large would be taken care of while they 
regained their lives (Z. Lemel, personal communication, February 13, 2017).  
Though this initiative has been criticized for its displacement of residents in 
recovery, the alternatives are bleak. Allowing residents to live in an area identified as 
high-risk would not only raise flood-insurance rates, but also risk their lives. In a 
situation like this, where mitigation is too costly or inadequate in reducing risk, and 
where other adaptation strategies like elevating structures are also ineffective on a low-
lying terrain, local residents and business owners are left with the financial burden of 
relocating to higher ground or face the possibility of rebuilding their properties time and 
time again with every new storm (RPA, 2015). Unlike the previous three case studies, 
the issue of resilience adversely impacts Edgemere, where the physical, economic, and 
social costs of retreat are felt directly by a community already impaired by its inherent 
vulnerabilities. In Edgemere, it is crucial to avoid creating “zones of disinvestment” that 
exacerbate existing socio-economic disparities (RPA, 2015). Instead, creating more 
resilient affordable housing on higher ground, while creating community consensus 
around the possibility of returning some flood-prone land back to nature, can ensure 
that more adaptive measures take place. 
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The most important components highlighted in the Resilient Edgemere 
Community Plan are creating resilient housing, protecting the neighborhood from 
flooding and storms, while improving access to the water, improving mobility and 
circulation, and encouraging neighborhood services and amenities (HPD, 2015). 
Historically characterized as a fractured and divided community, the City through this 
recent planning initiative has created new opportunities and pathways for community 
engagement to build trust. By fostering environmental stewardship through consistent 
public workshops, residents are able to develop a shared understanding of existing 
conditions, concerns, and desires for the future of Edgemere. Along with obtaining 
input from concerned residents and stakeholders to ensure that the final plan 
incorporates the local knowledge, aspirations, and concerns, HPD’s Resilient 
Edgemere Initiative strives to build trust and cohesion in a community that’s seen 
much disrepair. 
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Section 7.3 | Figure 28: Community events and programs conducted by RWA to build resilience.   
Photo Credit: Rockaway Waterfront Alliance.  
However, apart from the community plan, Edgemere’s community-based 
organizations are also showing major strides in aiding community members to facilitate 
change. Rockaway Waterfront Alliance is one great example of an organization that 
strives to empower residents of underserved Rockaway communities to play a crucial 
role as environmentally and socially responsible stewards. The Waterfront Alliance 
provides educational and community programming which fosters a deeper 
understanding, respect, and connection between the Rockaway community and its 
waterfront, to ensure the long-term sustainability and economic health of the 
Rockaway community (RWA). Key projects that stem from RWA are RISE: Rockaway 
Institute for a Sustainable Environment, a community-based program that strives to 
build social and environmental awareness by connecting emerging artist and scientists 
with local residents; Edgemere Farm, which explores ways to farm share within the 
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community and create agricultural benefits; Combating Rockaway’s Unmet Mental 
Health Needs, a partnership between RWA and NYC’s Department of Health that 
works with local nonprofits, health providers, and community members to tackle 
trauma and mental health needs; Resiliency Speakers, a speaker series hosted by RISE 
focused on engaging the public on issues pertaining to environmental resilience, urban 
planning, and sustainable development; and Project Underway, an effort to rally 
residents, business owners, transit advocates, and government agencies in working 
together to repurpose an underutilized freeway underpass space. While the Resilient 
Edgemere Community Plan Initiative strives to mitigate flooding impacts through a 
strategic buyout approach, integrating City-led initiatives along with social and civic 
initiatives like the Rockaway Waterfront Alliance, have the ability to make actionable 
items on the plan more feasible. As of March 2017, HPD and partner agencies have 
started to implement the community plan; however, to maximize efficiency, the 
Edgemere community will “need to play an active, engaged role over the next several 
years” to ensure the successful implementation of the community plan (HPD, 2017). 
Through efforts like these, there is still hope that Edgemere can cultivate the social 
cohesion, trust, and investment that the community has lacked in the past.  
 
Conclusions 
These four case studies demonstrate very unique community-centric 
approaches to building local resilience, however many of the themes still stay the 
same. Of the seven criteria for successful resilience projects, those that involved or 
were spurred by community-based organizations were the most fruitful. Community 
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organization, as seen in the Red Hook case study, is undoubtedly an integral 
component to successful recovery, both in immediate and long-term defense. It is 
apparent that even with knowledge sharing, financing, local partnerships, capacity 
building, urban design and development, and cultural ties and networks – community 
organizations are key to quicker recovery and building social resilience. Though 
physical defenses and infrastructural resilience mechanisms may vary in scale and are 
most definitely needed in these seaside communities, community-based organizations 
do more than mitigate hazards and reduce vulnerabilities – they provide support groups, 
safe networks, and platforms to empower and mobilize community members in the 
aftermath of disasters and in daily life. Disasters like Hurricane Sandy can severely 
debilitate a community by breaking social bonds and tearing networks, however 
stronger community organizations have the power to withstand the impact. The last 
chapter will observe best practices that are dissected from the case studies discussed 











Ch. 8 Conclusions 
8.1 Importance of Building Local Resilience and Social Capital through 
Community Organization 
Rebuilding, resisting, retaining, restoring and retreating are the five R’s that the 
Fourth Regional Planning Assembly has outlined as the foundational blocks of building 
resilience, and have been embodied through different strategies observed in the case 
studies in the last chapter. With the increasing challenges of future climate change risk 
in vulnerable coastal communities, it is one’s ability to respond to risk-induced events in 
the short term along with the flexibility of adapting and transforming for longer-term 
threats that ensures recovery, adaptation, mitigation, and persistence over a time span. 
The four case studies investigated in this thesis demonstrate that building capacities for 
social cohesion, social capital, and community organization not only provide layers of 
resilience that are community-specific, but help foster social resilience and stewardship 
that have the ability to outlast any kind of infrastructural feat. Therefore, layering and 
diversifying resilience policy and community engagement efforts to magnify existing 
community-based efforts with technical expertise on a larger platform, could be the 
basis for a research or think tank environment in various communities to define and 
innovate for local resilience. 
Equally as important, is community organization, since many communities now 
face the expense of resist and rebuild strategies, where they are most feasible in places 
with higher population density, higher economic value, or higher social vulnerability - 
excluding communities that do not fit the ‘criteria’ fit to build resiliency (RPA, 2015). 
Retain and restore are equally debatable components, since physical let alone social 
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investments in vulnerable communities are increasingly harder to attract, and alternative 
methods of financing is an issue many agencies are still trying to grasp. Retreat, is a 
highly sensitive issue and unlike the others, not an engineered resilience solution but 
one that imposes costs directly on those affected, which carries high-risk of creating a 
domino-affect if not done strategically. However, community organizing is a concept 
very heavily invested in by community-based organizations and highly successful 
projects; it not only forces stakeholders to look at the challenges of coastal flooding 
through a variety of approaches that integrate community needs through physical, 
social, economic, and educational layers – but also, creates advocacy at the local level. 
From the eleven findings and lessons extracted from interviews with 
policymakers, government officials, agency coordinators, urban planners, technical 
consultants, and architects, every single interviewee expressed the importance, 
strength, and enrichment of working alongside community-based organizations from the 
beginning, to ensure that the strongest community plans, policies and programs are put 
forth while long-term resilience is incrementally built up from within. Capacity-building 
efforts and adaptive pathways that look at flexible investments for the longevity of a 
community through its youth and innovation are alternative methods of creating 
sustainable futures for many of these communities as well. Though technical policies 
ensure that resilience is adapted from a structural point of view and land use is 
reconfigured to adapt to climate change needs, these policies need to be more multi-
faceted to be able to speak to communities in a way that is informative yet case specific 
- inspiring yet viable.  
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8.2 Best Practices 
 
 Agencies across the City of New York have made great strides in advancing local 
resilience, and throughout the ones listed in this thesis, a few best practices have 
emerged. First, the future of resilient communities relies not only on physical 
infrastructural improvements, but also social and intangible investments to nurture and 
develop social capacity, social cohesion, and social capital in vulnerable areas. Second, 
effective capacity building requires diversifying and directing technical expertise to 
engage with marginalized communities in ways that best suit their needs, while keeping 
in mind sensitivity to culture and context. Third, local stakeholders and community 
leaders are critical liaisons between decision makers and the community, and can help 
guide projects and facilitate community engagement; so, working with them closely can 
help build trust and transparency. Fourth, coordination of local agencies, stakeholders, 
technical expertise, and community members through various charrettes and place-
based workshops, can help disseminate roles, instill social responsibility and ensure 
continuous feedback and contribution from the community. Finally, community-based 
organizations are resourceful and can help unlock social and economic value from 
urban assets that open innovative pathways of resilience for community longevity, 
through potential of youth and organizational impact. By repurposing and reimagining 
one’s environment and vulnerabilities through collaborative social policy and program, 
the missing gaps in establishing and ensuring community-based resilience can be filled. 
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Ch. 9 Index 
Interviews 
• Jessica Colon - Office of Recovery and Resiliency  
• Tara Eisenberg – Rebuild by Design 
• Lynn Englum – Rebuild by Design 
• Elijah Hutchison – New York City Economic Development Corporation 
• Asima Jensveld – HR&A Advisors 
• Douglas Le – Chief of Staff; Office of Recovery and Resiliency  
• Zachary Lemel – New York City Housing Preservation and Development 
• Marion McFadden – Department of Housing and Urban Development & 
Enterprise 
• Thaddeus Pawlowski – New York City Department of City Planning 
• Joyce Rosenthal – Columbia Earth Institute 
• Jamie Springer – HR&A Advisors 
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